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INTRODUCTION
Whereas in the early nineties economists tended to deal with the economic as-
pects of transition isolated from the other spheres of society, today our gild has “come
to appreciate the multiplicity of institutional, political and cultural factors that influ-
ence the economic reform process” [Pickel, 1997, 221]. Yet special research into the
interactions between the different social spheres in the process of transition has only
just begun. On the basis of a historical comparison between the German economic
reforms after World-War II and the Russian transition in the 1990s, this paper deals
with the relations between prevailing patterns of thought, economic ideology and
policy-making in transition countries.
When the former Soviet Union collapsed, this meant not only the breakdown of
an economic and political system, but also of an ideology that had been, in spite of the
disapproval of many intellectuals, shared by the vast majority of citizens of the coun-
try [see Gadzhiyev, 1996, 30]. Political and economic ideologies can be seen as a part of
what Arthur Denzau and Douglass C. North call “shared mental models” [1994]. Ac-
cording to their definition, mental models are “internal representations that indi-
vidual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment” [Denzau and North,
1994, 4]. Ideologies, then, may be seen as “the shared framework of mental models
that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environ-
ment and a prescription as to how the environment should be structured” [Denzau and
North, 1994, 4; my italics]. The decisive characteristic of shared mental models is
their path-dependency. The images people produce and communicate about are based
on religious and cultural traditions that reach far into and are deeply intertwined with
history [Denzau and North, 1994, 22].
It is the starting point of my analysis that the patterns of thought prevailing in a
given society must be considered when elaborating the problem of rapid institutional
change. A politically implemented economic structure which is incompatible with the458 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
cultural and intellectual traditions prevailing in that society will, in the long run,
either be modified according to the prevailing shared mental models or will be com-
pletely replaced by a different type of organizational structure [see North, 1997, 17;
Oleynik, 1997/1998, 21; Pejovich, 2003, 349]. In this sense Alfred Mueller-Armack, the
originator of the concept of Social Market Economy, noticed “that every political and
economic change may deepen its roots only if it was preceded by a change of the
central weltanschauung of a time” [Mueller-Armack, (1941) 1944, 72].1 From this point
of view, the art of transforming a post-socialist society mainly consists in linking new
ideas and institutional structures to a people’s mental propensities.2 But there is an-
other dimension to this problem. The countries undergoing transition strongly de-
pend on Western aid. To gain financial support the governments need to convince the
Western financial institutions of their reform strategy. Thus, in addition to the inter-
action between political rulers and electorate, the interaction between national politi-
cal rulers and international economic institutions comes into play.
The political decision-maker is likely to find her- or himself in a dilemma: On the
one hand, she or he has to deal with the shared mental models of his people, which in
a country that has passed through catch-up development are likely to be anti-capital-
ist, as I will show in the following. On the other hand, she or he must take into
consideration the economic ideology prevailing in the Western world, which tends to be
clearly pro-capitalist.
In history, there is one frequently-quoted example of the successful implementa-
tion of a market economy in a society which had gone through (1) catch-up develop-
ment and (2) totalitarianism, in which (3) the shared mental models of the population
seemed not to favor capitalism, and (4) where the political will and the economic
ideology of foreign powers had to be considered: The Federal Republic of Germany (in
the following: Germany) after World War II.3 The question of whether the German
“Social Market Economy” could be a model for Russia has indeed already been widely
discussed in both the Russian and the German literature on transition since the 1990s.4
Unfortunately, in the discussion about the applicability of the German model to Rus-
sia the cultural-ideological dimension has so far been neglected almost entirely.5 Yet
the originator of “Social Market Economy”, Alfred Mueller-Armack, was not acciden-
tally a representative of the neo-historical school of economics and devoted his theo-
retical work almost entirely to the so-called theory of economic styles [see Kaufhold,
1996; more detailed Schefold, 1994]. This theory deals, in the interdisciplinary tradi-
tion of German Sozialwissenschaft (social science), with the interaction between
economy and culture, especially religion. The starting point of this research program
was the assumption that the economy is “part and expression of a general lifestyle”
[Mueller-Armack, (1941) 1944, 29]. From this perspective, Mueller-Armack’s main
concern – and in my opinion this is highly relevant in regard to Russia – was how the
acceptance of capitalism might be improved in a country, where the population tradi-
tionally had distinct socialist and romantic propensities. At the same time the rhetoric
of Social Market Economy as an outspoken liberal reform program met the political
demand of the Western Allies, especially the Americans, who at the beginning of the
cold war wished to establish a liberal and capitalist society in the Western part of
Germany in order to demonstrate the superiority of the Western model.6 My central459 GERMANY AFTER WORLD WAR II AND CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
purpose is to shed light on this neglected aspect of transition by elaborating the Ger-
man case in some detail, and to ask whether and how this experience can be applied to
today’s Russia.7
The paper is divided into six sections. In section two I will demonstrate, with
reference to the ideas of Karl Polanyi and Niklas Luhmann, that in terms of the
institutional structure of society the task of transition mainly consists in establishing
the prerequisites for the differentiation of a subsystem “economy” from society. If it is
true that the task of transition is not just to substitute the planned economy with the
market economy but also to cope with a cultural heritage that both in Germany and in
Russia seems to have favored totalitarianism, one must also raise the question of
structural parallels between the German and Russian “roads to serfdom”. So, in sec-
tion three I will give a short outline of an interpretation of totalitarianism that under-
stands both Hitlerism and Stalinism as the result of a failed attempt of economic
modernization. Section four deals with the emergence of the concept of Social Market
Economy in the writings of Walter Eucken and Alfred Mueller-Armack. Section five
analyzes the implementation of the concept in post-war Germany. In the conclusion I
will give a preliminary answer to the question of what may be learned from the Ger-
man post-war experience for today’s Russia.
TRANSITION AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION
In Western economic literature the standard definition of transition goes as follows:
Generally interpreted as the replacement of one economic system by
another economic system; in the 1990s, the replacement of the planned
socialist economic system of the former Soviet Union and the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe with market economies [Gregory and Stuart,
1998, 18].8
In my opinion, the idea that the task of transition consists of substituting one
economic system with another is misleading at least. From a system’s theoretical
point of view, the decisive difference between the plan and the market is that only in
a market economy one can really speak of the existence of an economic system, be-
cause only in capitalist societies there exists a clear boundary between economics and
politics, which nevertheless, and this is central to my argumentation, do interact.
This was very clearly understood by Karl Polanyi, who wrote in 1944, in his master-
piece “The Great Transformation”:
A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional
separation into an economic and political sphere. Such a dichotomy is,
in effect, merely the restatement, from the point of view of society as
a whole, of the existence of a self-regulating market. It might be ar-
gued that the separateness of the two spheres obtains in every type of
society at all times. Such an inference, however, would be based on a
fallacy. ... Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions460 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
was there ... a separate economic system in society [Polanyi, (1944)
1975, 71].
Let us now take a brief look at how the uncoupling of the economy from society
evolves [in more detail see: Zweynert, 2002b]. This process of social differentiation
requires the establishment of private property, which removes the economy from the
realm of direct state influence. But this is only a prerequisite for the process of sepa-
ration. The actual conversion of the economy into a clearly distinguishable subsystem
of society takes place when communication within the system is specialized for eco-
nomically relevant aspects by excluding the social and political dimensions of eco-
nomic interaction. The ‘language’ of capitalist economic systems, i.e. the prices, says
something about economic shortages but it does not contain any information about
the social or political status of the interacting persons [see Luhmann, 1989, 13-42].
Accordingly, in capitalism we can clearly distinguish a political and an economic sys-
tem of society. A planned economy, by contrast, is an integral part of a primarily
undifferentiated social system. Since there is no systematic boundary separating its
political and economic components, there is no specialized communication with re-
gard to economic aims. Whereas – in an economic sense – the individual is essentially
deprived of power, the decisions made by the planning authorities are more strongly
oriented towards ideological and political criteria than towards economic shortages.
In regard to economics, the main characteristic of totalitarianism is that the bound-
ary between politics and economics is eliminated. In totalitarian societies, the eco-
nomic subsystem is completely subordinate to the political system. Hence, all eco-
nomic questions turn into questions of power. Peter F. Drucker in his book The End
of Economic Man. The Origins of Totalitarianism [1939] saw this very clearly. The
question of whether the economic system in fascist societies – and he regarded both
Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany as “fascist” – is to be characterized as capitalist
or socialist he answered as follows: “It is, of course, neither. Having found both in-
valid, fascism seeks a society beyond socialism and capitalism that is not based upon
economic considerations. Its only economic interest is to keep the machinery of indus-
trial production in good working order” [Drucker, 1939, 132; my italics].
CATCH-UP DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND TOTALITARIANISM
In the previous section, I described the emergence of capitalism as an uncoupling
of the economic subsystem from society. It is the lasting achievement of Karl Marx
that he was the first observer of this process to understand that in a differentiating
society there can arise severe tensions between the emerging subsystems. Marx’ analysis
of the interaction between the political and the economic system was based on two
assumptions: first, that the being determines the conscience and, second, that the
tension in capitalist societies which, in his opinion, existed between the economic
base and the political and juridical superstructure, inevitably had to increase in the
course of development until the system would finally break down. His idealistic oppo-
nents focused their critique on the first assumption. In their opinion it was not the
economic base but, as Werner Sombart put it, “the spirit of the time ... which also
characterizes the economic performance of the period” [Sombart, (1916) 1969, vol. III/
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The vivid discussion about materialism versus idealism has led to some negli-
gence of Marx’ second assumption. This is somehow surprising because the general
idea that the tension between the differentiating subsystems increases in the course
of development is not necessarily bound to the question of whether the “spirit” or the
“economic base” is regarded as the dominant engine of change. The decisive point of
Marx’ argument is that the tension between the economic and the political subsystems
must rise and that this must lead to social revolution. With admirable analytical abil-
ity, the Russian revisionist Pyotr Struve showed as early as in 1899 that this assump-
tion is absolutely arbitrary. It was much more likely, he argued, that the contradic-
tions and tensions between the subsystems would gradually tone down each other in
the long run [Struve, 1899, 664-72].
The main failure of the idealist assumption of the “primacy of the spirit” is that it
is unable to explain why capitalism, from the 19th century on, started to spread nearly
everywhere in the world, a process that has not yet come to an end. Even if it is true
that its original emergence in Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain was due to
certain intellectual and/or religious patterns [see North, 1995, 26-34], this does not
explain how it could make its way into other countries. In order to understand the
expansion of capitalism, we must bring into our analysis the political competition
between the national states. The capitalist uncoupling of the economy from society,
the establishment of a well-defined border between state and economy, proves to be a
superior institutional arrangement. It is a truism that there is a tight connection
between the economic prosperity of national states and their political power. Once
capitalism has developed in at least one country, less developed countries come under
political pressure to imitate this institutional arrangement.
Such a politically induced economic catch-up development initiated from ‘above’ is
the all-decisive historical experience Russia and Germany have in common. In my
opinion, the Russian and the German “roads to serfdom” must be considered within
the context of the conflict between economic catch-up development and the patterns
of thought prevailing in these societies. As I have elaborated elsewhere in more detail
[see Zweynert, 2002b], I am of the opinion that the mutual connections between “spirit”
and “substance” are too complex to be understood by the human mind. Consequently,
we are forced to make simplified assumptions about these connections. In order to
understand the link between catch-up development and the prevailing patterns of
thought in a society, it seems to be a suitable starting point to assume that in societies
there is usually at least a rough conformity between economic structure and prevail-
ing patterns of thought. According to Karl Polanyi’s description of the “Great Trans-
formation” from feudalism to capitalism, the main difference between a capitalist and
a non-capitalist society is that the former is to a higher degree differentiated whereas
the latter is more homogenous. With regard to the economic structure the main
difference is that in capitalist societies we can clearly distinguish a political and an
economic system of society, whereas in non-capitalist societies this is impossible, be-
cause these spheres are inseparably intertwined. So, according to the assumption of
conformity between economic structure and patterns of thought, we can assume that
in non-capitalist societies holistic patterns of thought are likely to prevail, whereas in
capitalist societies the patterns of thought will reflect the differentiation of that soci-
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In the case of a ‘natural’ emergence of capitalism, the evolution of the economic
structure and the development of the prevailing patterns of thought go hand in hand,
although certainly not without tensions. And the question of whether it is the change
in the economic structure that leads to a shift in the patterns of thought or the other
way round is not of interest to us here. Rather, what I want to argue is that the
original equilibrium between economic structure and patterns of thought is disturbed
in the case of catch-up development. This disturbance is politically induced, but it has
a direct impact on the economic structure of the society concerned. The resulting
disequilibrium would not be problematic if the patterns of thought adapted to the new
economic structure of society quickly. Yet as Russian and German history prove, this
is not always the case.
However, there are examples of countries in which this adaptation seems not to
have caused significant problems. Hence, there must be additional factors that deter-
mine the ability of societies to adapt to changes in the ‘economic base’. One important
factor, in my opinion, lies in the specific religious or intellectual traditions of countries
or cultural regions. By saying that usually there is a harmony between economic
structure and “spirit”, I did not specify the patterns of thought prevailing in non-
capitalist societies. In fact, which specific patterns of thought prevail in a country is
not determined by the economic structure. Rather, it is very much due to historical
accident.10 Historical specificity makes it impossible to construct highly abstract mod-
els.11 It forces us to confine our analysis to specific countries. Yet I think that the
following general statement is still possible: If it is true that the “Great Transforma-
tion” is a transition to a more complex, differentiated order, then the tension between
economic modernization and the prevailing patterns of thought will be stronger (1)
the more rapid the spurt of economic development is and (2) the more the specific
religious and/or intellectual patterns prevailing in a society are shaped by holistic
traditions.12
If we combine the above-mentioned point with Alexander Gerschenkron’s [1962]
famous thesis that the spurt of economic development will be the greater the more
backward a country is, we may conclude that the path of economic modernization is
the more risky the more backward the starting position of a country is. While this is
not really a surprising finding, we may also conclude that especially a quick develop-
ment of capitalism, and that is, successful developmental policy, is likely to generate
strong protest movements against the differentiation of society13 – and this is exactly
what happened in Germany in the “golden twenties”, as we shall see later.
The tensions between traditional values and the modernization of social reality in
developing countries regularly make themselves felt in an ideological division within
the educated elite: One group speaks out in favour of the modernization of the country
to overcome political and economic backwardness. As this usually means aiming at
imitating the development of Western Europe or the USA, in the Russian literature
this camp is strikingly referred to as “westernizers.” A second group strictly opposes
the idea that the society should enter the Western path of social differentiation and
speaks out for a ‘national’ path of development that aims at maintaining the tradi-
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tiation. What is typical for this group is its orientation towards the pre-modern past of
society, and therefore in the following I will refer to this camp as the “romanticists”.
Such an ideological division within the intellectual elite is problematic in at least
two regards. For one thing, every more or less modern society is characterized by a
certain degree of cultural fragmentation. Yet widespread dissent about fundamental
ideological questions simply means that the different members of society have funda-
mentally different interpretations about their environment. This destabilizes the ex-
pectations about the behavior of the other members of society and hence raises the
transaction costs of all kinds of social interaction [see Denzau and North, 1994, 19;
Pejovich, 2003, 351-2]. The second point is tightly connected with the first: If the
country is ideologically divided, this can easily lead to political and economic destabi-
lization, because a change of power will be likely to bring about a radical political
change of course. If society as a whole is unsettled between the alternatives, ideologi-
cal division may even lead to a political zig-zag. In the worst case the clash between
westernizers and romanticists may even result in a counter-revolution against de-
mocracy and capitalism.
In the short run, it is even likely that a rapid spurt of economic development
enforces anti-capitalist sentiments because it deepens the gap between dominant pat-
terns of thought and economic reality. In the long run, however, following Struve we
would expect that the prevailing patterns of thought will more and more adapt to the
new economic structure of society.14 The conflict between westernizers and romanti-
cists, reflecting this tension, runs like a thread through the Russian and German
social philosophy of the 19th and early 20th century. But after decades of bitter argu-
ment between the two camps, on the eve of the October Revolution and the National
Socialists’ seizure of power respectively, it looked very much like the westernizers
would finally gain the upper hand.15 Why then did the attempt at modernization fail
and why did both countries enter the “road to serfdom”?
This can only be understood if the impact of external political shocks is included
into our model16. In his famous article on “Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics”
W. Brian Arthur asked, “if an economic system is locked-in to an inferior local equilib-
rium, is ‚exit‘ or escape into a superior one possible? There is rarely in economics any
mechanism corresponding to ‚annealing‘ (injections of outside energy that ‚shake‘ the
system into new configurations so that it finds its way randomly into a lower cost
one)” [Arthur, 1988, 16]. In my opinion, under certain circumstances external shocks
can indeed provide the outside energy necessary to push society to a new path of
development. Because of cultural continuity, this new path will, however, not entail a
complete departure from the historical past of the society in question. The ’switch’
from one path to another is possible, because in modern, highly differentiated societ-
ies a variety of institutional possibilities can be found. In this sense, it is social differ-
entiation that enables modern societies to adapt quickly to a changing environment
whenever external shocks occur.17
In the following, I will confine my analysis to Germany. As in a living organism,
when a society encounters an external shock, for example a war or a natural disaster,
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the principle of solidarity which, in highly differentiated societies, tends to decrease.
Where the economic system has uncoupled from society, an economic crisis is nothing
else but an external shock and one might expect society to react to this shock by
temporarily weakening the boundary between the political and the economic systems.
Exactly this is what happened everywhere in the Western world during the Great
Depression. In the USA, for example, the New Deal Policy under President Roosevelt
led to strong political interventions into the economic system, and one might question
whether an economy with administrated prices can still be regarded as autonomous.
And not surprisingly, also in the USA, the economic crisis led to a blossoming of
socialist ideas. But on the whole, very few American (or British) intellectuals gener-
ally questioned the path of social differentiation. And the few who did, could not find
mass support for their ideas in a broader stratum of the population.
In Germany, however, the economic crisis led to a vigorous revival of the holistic
patterns of thought among both intellectuals and the broad stratum of the population
[in detail see Hock, 1960]. As Friedrich August von Hayek put it in his highly contro-
versial book The Road to Serfdom, the attitude of German intellectuals as well as that
of the majority of German economists in the time of the Great Depression may be
described as “economophobia” [Hayek, (1944) 1994, 222]. But it is crucial not to forget
that German anti-capitalism, which can be traced back at least to the early 19th cen-
tury, did not start with the Great Depression. Already in the “golden twenties” – and
clearly as a reaction to rapid economic development – German economic thinkers like
Werner Sombart, Othmar Spann, Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld and Oswald Spengler
repeatedly condemned the disintegration of society and called for a return to the
absolute supremacy of state power [Janssen, 2000, chapter 2]. Then their views did
not remain unchallenged [see below, section 5], but when the Great Depression broke
out in Germany these social scientists had prepared the ground for the radical anti-
capitalism that was one of the decisive forces which brought the Nazis to power. The
link between the German economophobia and the emergence of totalitarianism was
suitably described by Peter F. Drucker:
It is not that the standard of knowledge of the economists has deterio-
rated. It is the belief in the desirability and in the necessity of the
sovereignty and autonomy of the economic sphere that is disappear-
ing; and with the belief, the reality [Drucker, 1939, 49].
SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY AS AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE
TOTALITARIAN HERITAGE
The totalitarian experience clearly shows that politically induced catch-up devel-
opment is a risky path in countries where the potentially holistic patterns of thought,
reflecting economic backwardness, are enforced by specific religious and intellectual
traditions. In such countries there can appear a wide gap between the fact of social
differentiation and the holistic ideal of a homogenous society according to which there
shall be no borderline between the political and the economic sphere: Capitalism may
blossom, while at the same time in broader strata of the population there is deep465 GERMANY AFTER WORLD WAR II AND CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
discomfort caused by the ‘atomization’ of society. The divergence between the eco-
nomic structure and the prevailing patterns of thought, both in Russia and in Ger-
many, may be seen as one of the causes of totalitarianism. The success of Social
Market Economy in Germany can, to a certain extent, be explained by the very fact
that it paid attention to the question of how the acceptance of capitalism within the
German population might be improved. As we shall see, it contained both “Western”
and romantic elements and therefore helped to reconcile the traditional arguments
between these ideological camps. This was no accident: The concept of Social Market
Economy had two ‘fathers’, one of whom was a thorough westernizer, whereas the
other originally belonged to the romanticist wing of the German intellectuals.
Walter Eucken [1890-1950, on his biography see Lenel, 1989; Johnson, 1989] was
educated in the tradition of the German historical school, but split with historicism in
the 1920s to become a spokesman both for theoretical economics modeled along clas-
sical lines and for economic liberalism.18 Again and again he questioned the conviction
of the members of the historical school that in the late stage of capitalism the concen-
tration process and the amalgamation of the political and the economic spheres were
inevitable. One year before the Nazis returned Germany to barbarism, in an article
on “Structural Changes of the State and the Crisis of Capitalism”, he bluntly con-
fronted his historicist colleagues with the viewpoint that “it was the liberal state of the
19th century”, which, by strictly separating the state and the economy, was “the soil in
which capitalism could thrive” [Eucken, 1932, 302]. In urgent words Eucken warned
against “modern anti-capitalism” which wanted to substitute the institutional separa-
tion between the economic and the political spheres of society by “a total state, which
shall embrace the economy” [Eucken, 1932, 305].
The call for a strict division of labor between the political and the economic sys-
tem was also clearly expressed in Eucken’s major theoretical work The Foundations
of Economics (1940, English translation 1950), in which he outlined his theory of eco-
nomic order. Its main thesis is that there are two general possibilities to organize a
society economically: planned and market economy. Mixed forms, in his opinion, can-
not be durable because in the long run society will inevitably turn into one of the two
forms. The task of the government, then, is to choose between the market and the
central plan as economic co-ordination mechanism and to provide a coherent eco-
nomic policy. Much as this may sound like a technocrat’s analysis of alternative mod-
els of economic order, one must bear in mind that The Foundations were published in
1940. And between the lines Eucken left little doubt that he preferred market economy,
because socialism could never provide “an effective and lasting system, which does
justice to the dignity of man, for this new industrialized economy with its far-reaching
division of labor” [Eucken, 1950, 314]. Such an order Eucken called Ordo.19 This term
goes back to scholastic thought and means a natural social order which “is the mean-
ingful bringing together of diversity to a whole” [Eucken, 1959, 239]. By referring to
human dignity Eucken explicitly introduced a normative element into his theory of
economic order.20
For the purpose of this paper it is important to understand that Eucken’s dictate
that in a market economy there should be a strict boundary between state and economy
and that the former shall only intervene into the economic process in exceptional466 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
cases, can be regarded as a “westernizer’s” position. At the same time, the desire to
transform the fragmented modern world into an organic whole, as it is expressed in
the term Ordo, shows traces of the holistic tradition of German social philosophy.
Although this tradition played a certain role in Eucken’s thought, it was much more
central an element in the socio-economic reasoning of Alfred Mueller-Armack, to whom
we shall now turn.
Alfred Mueller-Armack [1901-1978, on his biography see Watrin, 2000; Willgerodt,
2002] entered the academic scene in 1932 with a work on the Developmental Laws of
Capitalism. In this book he presented himself as a very typical German economist of
his time. Not only was he historicist in method and demanded a fusion of politics and
economics under the guidance of a strong state. One year later, in a small work on
State-idea and Economic Order in the New Reich he even explicitly welcomed the
Nazi-dictatorship, because it put an end to the artificial limitation of state power to
jurisdiction and administration and finally made it “borderless” [Mueller-Armack, 1933,
11]. His excitement about the new regime, however, was soon to turn into disappoint-
ment21 and he entered into what he later called inner emigration.
After the end of World War II, under the influence of Walter Eucken, he, too,
became a proponent of “a constitutional division of power between state and economy”,
demanding that they had to be “strictly separated” [Mueller-Armack, (1948) 1974, 100].
But in line with the historical school he always remained an adherent of a method-
ological approach that paid attention to the sociological and cultural embeddedness of
economic performance.22 However, although the methodological as well as the politi-
cal views of Walter Eucken and Alfred Mueller-Armack were contrary in the early
1930s, there was one important unifying element in their thought even then. The
historical economists were adherents of a political relativism according to which eco-
nomic policy could not be based on general economic laws but had to react not only to
the economic conditions of time and space but also to the general “spirit of the times”
(Zeitgeist). This relativism somehow deprived economists of their authority as politi-
cal consultants because every development seemed to be justified if only it could be
explained by specific intellectual or real circumstances. One of the central aims of the
founders of the Freiburg school was to re-establish the consulting function of aca-
demic economics towards politics.
Exactly this was also the main concern of Alfred Mueller-Armack’s historicist
economics.23 In his Developmental Laws of Capitalism he regretted that in Germany a
situation had emerged in which the intellectuals were not able to provide “orienta-
tion”, because they had either turned away from politics or did “not find the courage to
act diplomatically and so deprived themselves of political influence” [Mueller-Armack,
1933, 194]. Thus, in contrast to the adherents of the historical school and similar to
Eucken, Mueller-Armack focused on how the economist could help to establish and to
defend the economic and political order. Yet “diplomacy”, which here means the art of
convincing others of one’s ideas, can only be integrated into economic thought if socio-
logical and cultural factors are taken into account. Thus, there is no space for diplo-
macy in Eucken’s theory of economic order. In this sense it was the methodological
legacy of the German historical school which made Mueller-Armack aware of the fact
that the politician who wished to establish a new political and economic order first had467 GERMANY AFTER WORLD WAR II AND CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
to analyze the prevailing cultural and intellectual patterns in the country concerned.
Only by acting diplomatically, that is – at least seemingly – in accordance with the
political mood and the intellectual propensities of people will the politician gain the
opportunity to exercise lasting influence on the course of events.
WHAT HAPPENED IN GERMANY?
The German “economic miracle” can only be properly understood if one considers
the question of how the intellectual fathers of Social Market Economy managed to
“sell” their vision of a liberal economic system to a population that was feeling highly
ambivalent about capitalism to say the least, and to the Western Allies, who were
irresolute about how quickly the German elite should be allowed to regain political
sovereignty. Although both these processes of communication – the national and the
international one – are intertwined, I shall here deal with them separately.
The national dimension
Speaking about national economic ideologies is quite an ambiguous thing. It is
often overlooked that modern societies are too differentiated for the identification of
homogenous cultural patterns to be possible [for this critique see Wimmer, 1996].
Nevertheless, the idea that the traditions of thought prevailing in a country are path-
dependent and that therefore at least some continuous traditions can be figured out,
finds an impressive confirmation in the history of German economic thought. The
decisive constant of German economics, from the Cameralists to the Historical Schools,
can be seen in the holistic conviction that society forms a homogenous whole [see
Pribram, 1983, 209-24]. This holistic methodological approach went hand in hand with
the demand for a fusion of state and economy or, to put it another way, with a hostile
attitude towards the emergence of an autonomous economic sphere of society. Insofar
as the economic quintessence of totalitarianism is the complete subordination of the
economy under political power, national socialism can be seen as a perversion of a
tradition that was already prevalent in the German romanticist and historicist strands
of social and economic thought [Janssen, 2000, 119-20].
The breakdown after the end of the Nazi-regime had ambiguous effects on Ger-
man economic ideology. On the one hand, “trust in the benevolence of the govern-
ment and the wisdom of the authorities was lastingly shattered” so that “it was the
fondest wish of the population to be freed from any tutelage” [Haeuser, 1964, 234]. On
the other hand, there were two factors that operated in the opposite direction. First,
the German habit of relying on the authorities in periods of crisis was still very much
alive, despite the totalitarian experience. Second, it was the common view at the time
that it was capitalism that had brought the Nazis to power [see Blum, 1969, 10-11].
This conviction was by no means restricted to the left; indeed, all the major parties
were in search for collectivist solutions for the task of reconstruction [Nicholls, 1994,
131].24 As Reinhard Blum has thoroughly documented, directly after the end of the
war, the question for the overwhelming majority of the population as well as for the468 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
intellectual elite was not capitalism or socialism, but how socialism should be orga-
nized [Blum, 1969, 26-37].
The story of the rise of Social Market Economy can in a way be seen as an ex-
ample of the successful division of labor [Klump, 1997, 130-2]: If Walter Eucken had
laid the theoretical foundation with his theory of economic order, it was up to Adam
Mueller-Armack to supplement this order-theoretical basis with sociological and po-
litical aspects. Only by doing so he was able to offer a reform program which was then
transformed into policy by Ludwig Erhard. Although, as Andreas Pickel [1997] has
convincingly shown, it is typical for transition processes that these three aspects – the
theoretical, the ideological and the political one – are closely connected, Alfred Mueller-
Armack is certainly the key figure of the German reform strategy as far as economic
ideology is concerned. Therefore in the following I will concentrate on him.
Mueller-Armack saw the main failure of classical liberalism in the idea that the
task of establishing a market economy in post-war Germany could be regarded as a
purely economic problem, whereas he held that
Although there appears in Germany occasionally the thought that what
is needed is only a conscious unfolding of the competitive order and
that this by itself will make it possible to bring social problems under
control, it should have become evident by now that such a reliance on
direct interaction will not provide for a solution on the task before us.
The job does not merely consist in shaping an economic order, but
also enquires its incorporation into a total life style [Mueller-Armack,
1978, quoted by Haselbach, 1991, 155].
More than that, absolutely in line with the holistic traditions of German social phi-
losophy Mueller-Armack was of the opinion that free capitalism would lead to an
“atomization” of society [Mueller-Armack, (1950) 1974b, 108].25 Therefore for him the
task of social policy was “to give our society a formula of integration, which ... binds
tensions and provides a realistic foundation of community” [Mueller-Armack, (1962)
1974c, 153; my italics]. In order to overcome modern “over differentiation”, Mueller-
Armack demanded a new “unity of style which can only be derived from the unifor-
mity of belief” [Mueller-Armack, (1948) 1959a, 456].
For him, therefore, the question arose how the prevailing religious and secular
ideologies could be reconciled and transformed into unity. In order to achieve this
aim, he developed his Soziale Irenik [Mueller-Armack, (1950) 1959b]: As he noticed, in
post-war Germany there were four significant “intellectual powers”: Catholicism,
Protestantism, Marxist socialism and liberalism. Every ideological group was con-
fronted with the task of “overcoming its intellectual isolation and paying attention to
the demands of the other groups” [Mueller-Armack, (1950) 1959b, 578]. Note: To pay
attention to the ideas of other ideological camps does not necessarily mean to include
their wishes into one’s own concept. In a diplomatic sense it can also mean to take
into account other ideologies in order to “sell” a reform program to these groups.
Exactly this is what the ideological dimension of Social Market Economy is all about.
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had taught him that in Germany there was a widespread demand for Gebundenheit
(the feeling of being part of a social collective, a community). The “third way” Mueller-
Armack offered was not so much a compromise between capitalism and socialism as
between differentiation and integration of society. This is already demonstrated by
the term “Social Market Economy” itself: “Social” stands for the integration of society.
According to the famous distinction of Ferdinand Toennies, groups of people orga-
nized according to social principles are communities (Gemeinschaften) rather than
societies (Gesellschaften). So, in accordance with the holistic patterns of thought pre-
vailing in German culture, the adjective “social” raised positive emotions in the Ger-
man population. But what is more, for decades it had been the very battle cry of
several protest movements against capitalism – and it surely is no accident that even
the Nazis made use of it. “Social” was, one may say, a killer word against capitalism in
German political discourse. Mueller-Armack’s stroke of genius was to link it with a
euphemism for its potential victim. This meant to transform the word “social” into a
“weasel word” in the Hayekian sense26 that, from now on, served a very alien master:
capitalism. By promising a “third way” between capitalism and socialism and by rhe-
torically linking an adjective that represented “community” with a noun that stood for
“society” the “irenical formula” (irenische Formel) Social Market Economy played an
important part in overcoming the intellectual dissent between “westernizers” and
“easternizers” in post-war Western Germany and in achieving a wider acceptance of
capitalism within the population. Of course it shall not be overlooked that the wide-
spread acceptance of capitalism in post-war Germany was not only due to political
rhetoric. The effect of the monetary reform of 1948 shall in no way be questioned
here. Yet the rhetorical formula “Social Market Economy” has been very much alive
in Germany up to the present day. Whenever an economic crisis arises, there is a
consensus from the left to the right that the concept of Social Market Economy shall
not be abandoned but renewed and adapted to the new circumstances.27
The international dimension
So far, I have only dealt with the national dimension, the dialogue between policy-
makers and population. We shall now turn to the interaction between the German
intellectual and political elite and the Western Allies. For if one thing was clear in
post-war Germany it was that political and economic concepts which contradicted the
political aims of the Western Allies had no chance of being realized [Blum, 1969, 3;
Ambrosius, 1977, 218]. The question of how the German elite and the Allies inter-
acted, and to what extent the concept of Social Market Economy may be regarded as
the foundation of the German economic miracle, has been one of the favourite sub-
jects of investigation of German economic historians for decades [for a short overview
see Brackmann, 1993, 7-16]. As I am primarily concerned with questions of ideology
here, I shall leave this discussion aside and concentrate on the question of how Social
Market Economy tied in with the interests of the Western Allies. Directly after the
war they had rather different ideas about how Germany should be reconstructed: In
England, socialist thought was predominant at the time, France wanted above all to
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were irresolute between turning Germany into an agricultural country or forcefully
promoting its reconstruction [see Nicholls, 1994, 123-5]. Only when the political ten-
sion between East and West culminated did the position of the Allies become more
defined: First, it helped the Americans to gain dominance over France and Great
Britain. Second, the conflict between the political systems made the implementation
of a mixed system less likely and increased the chances for a decision in favour of a
“pure form” [Blum, 1969, 183; Ambrosius, 1977, 224-5]. It is true that the Americans
wished to establish a liberal order, and it is also true that Social Market Economy was
a liberal reform program. But does this allow us to conclude that Social Market Economy
fully coincided with the ideas of the Americans?
In a brilliant paper Terence Hutchison [1979] has shown that this was certainly
not the case. In the 1940s and ‘50s, he argues, Keynesian ideas were clearly dominant
in both British and American economics. Therefore, “in Britain and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in the United States, the most widely propagated doctrines on economic policy
contrasted sharply with those, inspired the infant Social Market Economy” in Ger-
many [Hutchison, 1979, 435]. As he shows, even American mainstream economists,
who surely could not be suspected of having socialist sympathies, feared that a reform
program “running against the tide of opinion and history, would fail both in terms of
production and distribution, in particular with regard to social welfare and the stan-
dard of living of the lower paid”. Some experts were indeed so skeptical about the
program that “it was even asserted that the East German planned economy might
forge ahead” [Hutchison, 1979, 440].
This shows that two aspects must be clearly distinguished: The prevailing political
climate and the dominant economic ideas. Unquestionably, against the background of
the cold war German economic policy could not possibly have ignored the political
demand to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism and democracy. At the same
time, political liberalism is compatible with a fairly wide range of economic concepts.
The idea of Social Market Economy suited the political demands of the Americans but
ran against the tide of Anglo-Saxon mainstream economics of that time. The key
figures of Social Market Economy, Walter Eucken, Alfred Mueller-Armack, and Ludwig
Erhard, gained space for action and eventually grasped the political initiative, because
they could draw on a reform program that had been worked on since the late 1930s.
The program of Social Market Economy can be seen as characteristically German in
that it was in line with the German tradition of finding a “third way” between capital-
ism and socialism, and in that it tried to reconcile the romanticists with the “western”
wing of German ideological traditions. The fact that Social Market Economy accorded
with the specific national habits of thought was the foundation that it worked to com-
bine a liberal order with the path-dependent shared mental models prevailing in Ger-
many.
The German experience shows that although countries undergoing transition cer-
tainly depend on the attitudes prevailing in the richer countries, there is still room for
action by the national elite. The degree of dependence on the ‘sponsors’ will indeed
depend mainly on whether there are persons able to provide coherent reform strate-
gies that take account of the specific circumstances of the country in question. More
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1903) expressed the thought that without such a “national idea”, which must not be
confused with a Sonderweg, the political rulers are bound to waver between the con-
tradictory recommendations of their Western advisers [Vitte, (1884) 1910, 154]. The
Russian experience of the 1990s indeed confirms the doubts whether it is possible to
reform a country without taking into account its historical past.
CONCLUSION
If we compare the German reforms after World War II and the Russian transition
of the 1990s we find two differences: First, the German reformers built on a reform
concept German liberal economists had worked on since the 1930s and which re-
flected the intellectual traditions of the country, whereas in Russia the neo-liberal
reform program of the 1990s was chosen “for reasons of fashion alone and because of
the recommendations of Western economists and political scientists” [Nikolayev and
Makhotaeva, 2003, 65], so that it lacked a solid understanding and backing even within
the scientific and political elite. Moreover, the implementation of a radical neo-liberal
reform program did nothing to ease the conflict between the ideological camps. As a
result, the Russian intellectual elite remains divided into slavophiles and westernizers
even today.
Second, mainly due to the legacy of historicism, the German liberals were ex-
tremely conscious of the fact that, as Ludwig Erhard wrote as early as 1943/44, the
government is “always only able to realize an economic order in accordance with the
mental images of the people in an economic and social respect” [Erhard, (1943/44)
1977, 2]. The ‘young reformers’ in 1990s Russia, on the other hand, showed little if any
interest at all in the political mood and the prevailing patterns of thought in the popula-
tion. As Anders Aslund, one of the leading experts on Russian transition, wrote in 1995:
A major problem in Russian society is that popular understanding of
the state of the economy and government policy is scant at best. Its
origin is the extraordinary distance between the rulers and the ruled
in communist society. Unfortunately, Yegor Gaidar’s decision not to
present a reform program at the beginning of the radical reform ex-
cluded people when they were most curious and supportive. A popular
complaint today is: ‚Nobody tells us anything‘ (...). In order to bridge
this gap, it is crucial for government and reformers to reach out to the
population explaining the dilemmas of society and telling people what
can and what should be done [Aslund, 1995, 13].
This holds true, in my opinion, up to the present day. There is a tradition in
Russian liberalism, deeply embedded in Russian history since the times of Peter the
Great and Catherine II, which maintains that a modernization of society is possible
only if the population is bypassed by authoritative political action ‘from above’ [Murrell,
1993, 135]. However, it was presumably also due to the influence of the neo-liberal
economic consultants that the political decision makers paid no attention to the men-
tal premises of a capitalist order.472 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
As a result of the failed attempt to quickly implement a Western economic and
political order in the early 1990s, both capitalism and democracy have been somewhat
discredited in Russia since about the middle of the ‘90s. A detailed analysis of the
change of political attitudes among the Russian population between 1992 and 2002 can
be found in the Centre for the Study of Political Policy’s study “A Decade of New
Russia Barometer Surveys” [Rose, 2002]. The authors of the study sum up the Russian
population’s attitude towards the economic system as follows:
When Russians are asked to evaluate economic systems, the economic
system before perestroika is consistently rated highest – and as Rus-
sians have acquired more experience of their market economy, those
approving the old system have risen to 80 percent. The current eco-
nomic system is consistently given a negative rating by most Rus-
sians. More than four-fifths were negative in 1992. The proportion
negative has fallen since. In 2001 for the first time the median Rus-
sian was neutral about the present economic system. Those positive
about the new system have risen from a small minority to 41 percent.
However, the mean rating on the scale remains negative, minus 12
[Rose, 2002, 40].
How contradictory the attitudes towards the market system still are is clearly
shown by the fact that from 1992 to 2001 approval of a socialist economic system has
risen from 62 to 82 percent, while at the same time approval of the current economic
system has risen from 9 to 29 percent [Rose, 2002, 51].
The example of the German Social Market Economy suggests that in order to
improve this situation, it would be necessary to develop a liberal reform strategy
which on the one hand pays attention to general economic principles, but which on
the other hand also takes into consideration the country’s specific cultural and histori-
cal traditions. In my opinion this is the only possible way to (1) overcome the dissent
between slavophiles and westernizers within the intellectual elite in Russia and (2) to
improve the acceptance of the market order within broader strata of the population.
The historical experience and scientific recommendations of the West are certainly
important for this discussion, but in the end it is up to the Russian elites to prepare
the ground for the acceptance of an open society in Russia.
The Russian experience with the reforms of the 1990s clearly confirms Alexander
Gerschenkron’s statement, “that the politics toward the backward countries are un-
likely to be successful if they ignore the basic peculiarities of economic backwardness”
[Gerschenkron, 1962, 30]. A key to the German success after World War II was that
not least due to the intellectual influence of the historical school the German liberal
reformers were aware that such peculiarities are not to be found in the economic
sphere of society alone, but that cultural and intellectual patterns are equally impor-
tant as ‘hard’ economic factors. In a way it is Russia’s misfortune that economists are
only now – and certainly to a significant degree due to the Russian experience of the
1990s – becoming increasingly aware again of an insight that was vital for the German473 GERMANY AFTER WORLD WAR II AND CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
reforms: namely, “that the process of transition ... is a cultural issue rather than a
mere technical one” [Pejovich 2003, 348].
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Nievers.
1. The assumption that institutional change presupposes a shift of the dominant shared mental
models does not mean, however, that I share the view of some German historicists of the 19th
century that the “national spirit” (Volksgeist) completely determines the political and economic
structure of that country [for a critique see Hodgson, 2001, chapters 4 and 9]. This view would, in
my opinion, lead to a fatalism that would make the discussion about cultural factors in transition
pointless. The main difficulty in grasping the links between culture and economic order is the
reciprocity of both. As Douglass C. North puts it: “It is the interplay between belief structure and
the external environment that shapes the belief structure” [North, 1995, 22].
2. Very much in line with this, Peter Murrell argues that since in the medium and long run politicians
cannot put through reforms against the will of the population, “although the lessons from the
experiences of other countries will be helpful, even the broad agenda of reform has to be carefully
calibrated to the existing features of society” [Murrell, 1995, 80].
3. To avoid a misunderstanding: I do not argue that the historical situations of Germany after 1945
and of Russia in the 1990s are identical, nor that the German reform strategy can or should be
imitated in today’s Russia. The point I want to make is that in German and in Russian history some
structural parallels, some common features can be detected, and that therefore in regard to the
future of Russian economic reforms it might be instructive to compare the two cases. For a careful
elaboration of the historical dimension of transition see Wagener, 1997.
4. In German literature see Cassel [1994], Radke [1995], Kartte [1996], Hoehmann [1997], in Rus-
sian literature see Mityaev [1992], Gutnik [1997], Chepurenko [2001], Kondraseva [2001]. There
is even evidence that the German model exercises some influence over the Putin administration:
At a symposium that took place in Germany in November 2000, Putin’s then chief economic
adviser German Gref answered the question of whether “social market economy in the time of
globalization [can] be a model for Russia” as follows: “Our goal is market economy with a social
countenance, whereby liberalization is the main foundation” [Graef, 2000, 46].
5. There has been a lively discussion on the question of whether the German Social Market Economy
is a “real” concept of economic policy or if it is to be seen mainly as a rhetoric formula. If I
concentrate on the second aspect in this paper, I do so only because it has been almost completely
neglected in the discussion on the significance of the concept to Russia, not because I want to deny
that there are indeed significant differences between the German and, for example, the US-
American contemporary versions of capitalism.
6. The strong sympathy for socialism across broad sections of society is certainly one feature Ger-
many and Russia had in common. Of course there were socialist and romantic movements in other
countries, too, but nowhere did they gather such strength as in Germany and Russia in the second
half of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century.
7. Of course it would be desirable to compare the historical development of Russia and Germany in
more detail. Unfortunately such a comparison, which would have to begin at least with the latest
in the early 19th century, is beyond the scope of a journal article.
8. In view of this definition rather surprisingly, the authors at least seem to suspect how problematic
their strict focus on economic problems is. So on page 78 they write: “Throughout this book, we474 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
focus on the economic rather than the political arrangements of the Soviet Union. This separation
is artificial, however, because the Communist Party was a powerful mechanism, influencing all
activities, especially economic activities, in the Soviet Union.”
9. In the introduction to his major work “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” [1962]
Alexander Gerschenkron pointed out that “the intellectual climate within which industrialisation
proceeded, its ‘spirit’ or ‘ideology,’ differed considerably among advanced and backward countries”
(p. 7). Unfortunately, he did not pursue this important thought systematically in his study.
10. The role Prussian Calvinism played in German history has been widely discussed in historiogra-
phy. It is well known that the expansion of Calvinism to Prussia can be traced back to a concrete
political incident, the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. Similarly, the fact that Russia
received Christianity via Byzantium, not via Rome, certainly had to do with her geographical
position – but this was in no way historically predetermined.
11. This is not only true regarding theories about economic development but also regarding modernity
in general. Because of the unquestionable influence that specific patterns of thought have on the
institutional structure of societies, there is not just one type of modernity but rather a multitude
of modernities, each one reflecting specific religious or cultural patterns [see e.g. Gusfield, 1967;
Eisenstadt, 2000]. On the other hand, I do not think that the cultural embeddedness of develop-
mental processes must necessarily contradict Talcott Parson’s famous thesis of the existence of
“evolutionary universals” in society [Parsons 1964]. Rather, it is the interdependence between
general and specific patterns that makes the evolution of society so complicated.
12. I cannot deal with the parallels between the German and Russian history of ideas in any detail
here. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that in both Germany and Russia there
existed holistic traditions of thought whose strength can certainly not be explained by the eco-
nomic ‘backwardness’ of these countries alone. The holistic traditions of German thought are
known also from the history of 19th- and early 20th-century economics in Germany. And the author
of the standard work on the history of Russian philosophy writes about Russian thought: “Russian
Philosophers, with rare exceptions, have sought wholeness, a synthetic unity of all aspects of
reality and all impulses of the human spirit” (Zen’kovsky, 2003 (1948), vol. 1, 7).
13. The then ‘heretical’ thesis that the rapid economic growth the American developmental policy of
the ‘50s and ‘60s was aiming to achieve had to be seen as a dangerous destabilizing force was
formulated in an interesting paper by Mancur Olson [1963]. Yet Olson, very much in line with the
methodological fashion of this time, completely ignored the cultural dimension of this destabiliza-
tion. According to him it is the “contradiction between the structure of economic power and the
distribution of social and political power” [ibid., 543] that causes political problems in rapidly
developing countries. Although I agree with his general assessment of the effects of rapid growth,
I do not find his line of argumentation particularly persuasive. In my opinion, the conflict between
prevailing patterns of thought and changes in reality offers a far more significant explanation of
destabilization in quickly developing countries than Olson’s somewhat materialistic argumenta-
tion.
14. By saying that in the course of capitalist development traditional values will be substituted by
modern ones I do not want to deny the persistency of traditional values. On the basis of the World
Value Surveys the American sociologists Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker have recently
come to the conclusion that on the one hand “economic development is associated with pervasive,
and to some extend predictable, cultural changes”, but on the other hand “the influence of tradi-
tional value systems is unlikely to disappear ... as belief systems exhibit remarkable durability and
resilience” [Inglehart and Baker, 2000, 49].
15. Thus, in the 1920s the organicistic approaches in German economics were gradually replaced by
concepts modeled more on ‘western’, i.e. Anglo-Saxon ideas [see Janssen, 2000, chap. 2].The shock
of the ‘Great Depression’ then led to a revival of holistic concepts in the 1930s (see below). In
Russia, the October Revolution was preceded by the so-called ‘Silver Age’ of Russian culture,
during which the country seemed to change course both culturally and economically, moving quite
clearly towards a ‘western’ path of development.
16. On external shocks as a source of institutional change see Raiser, 2001, 223.
17. As Geoffrey Hodgson puts it, “complexity and variety within the system are necessary so that the
system can survive and deal with complexity, variety and unforeseeable shocks in the real world”
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18. The most comprehensive work on the evolution of Eucken’s economic thought is Goldschmidt,
2002.
19. This term was included only into the sixth edition of 1950. Therefore it is missing in the English
translation, which is based on the fifth edition from 1947.
20. All in all, Christian ethics was such an integral part of ordo-liberal thought that it seems fully
justified to say that “ordo-liberals treat economics as a moral science” [Peacock and Willgerodt,
1989, 5; see also Rieter and Schmolz, 1993; Goldschmidt, 2002].
21. As his pupil Christian Watrin notes, it is now impossible to reconstruct how long Mueller-Armack
remained convinced that National Socialism would solve the crisis of the modern age. We can see,
however, that the ideas he expressed in his cultural and religio-sociological writings of the follow-
ing years, which picked up the thread from Werner Sombart and especially Max Weber, were
“directly contradictory to the biological racism of National Socialism” (Watrin, 1988, 51).
22. In an article on “The scientific origins of Social Market Economy” (Die wissenschaftlichen
Urspruenge der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft) Mueller-Armack explicitly pointed out the historicist
roots of Social Market Economy [see Mueller-Armack, 1973, 248].
23. Therefore, his policy-oriented style-theoretical approach had little in common with “the more
diffuse concepts” of verstehende Nationaloekonomie [see Klump, 1997, 148].
24. Even the party of Ludwig Erhard, the conservative Christian Democrats, still proposed the nation-
alization of the coal, iron and steel industries in their Ahlen program of 1947.
25. “Today, the state of society in the world is characterized by social disintegration, by a division of the
individual as well as of society” [Mueller-Armack, 1950a, 108].
26. “As a weasel is alleged to be able to empty an egg without leaving a visible sign, so can these words
deprive of content any term to which they are prefixed while seemingly leaving them untouched”
[Hayek, 1988, 116].
27. Indeed, it is to be observed that in German economic policy the irenical formula “Social Market
Economy” provides a high degree of continuity. This continuity has its dark side, however. For it
can prevent the implementation of more radical reforms, which are all too easily suspected of
putting an end to Social Market Economy. This mechanism can be clearly observed in the current
debate about structural change in Germany.
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